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I.  AN ABBREVIATED ACCOUNT OF HUMAN                                            
RIGHTS IN GENERAL1 
To say much of interest about a particular human right, we have to 
know its content.  So we have to know how to decide its content.  That is 
where I shall start. 
We agree that human rights are rights that we have simply in virtue of 
being human.  That does not get us very far, though, because we lack 
agreement on the relevant sense of “human.”  Thus, our notion of a 
“human right” suffers from no small indeterminateness of sense.  During 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when thinkers increasingly 
 * White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Corpus Christi College, Oxford University. 
 1. This Article is adapted from my new book, JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
(2008). 




accepted that human rights were available to reason alone apart from 
belief in God, the theological content of the notion was gradually 
abandoned, and nothing was put in its place.  The term was left with so 
few criteria for determining when it is used correctly and when incorrectly 
that we often have only a tenuous, and sometimes plainly inadequate, 
grasp on what is at issue.  One of our pressing jobs now is to remedy the 
indeterminateness. 
A term with our modern sense of “a right” emerged in the late Middle 
Ages, probably first in Bologna, in the work of the canonists who 
glossed, commented on, and to some extent brought system to the many, 
not always consistent, norms of canon and Roman Law.2  In the course 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the use of the Latin word ius 
expanded from meaning a law stating what is fair to include our modern 
sense of “a right,” that is, an entitlement a person possesses to control or 
claim something.  For instance, in this period one finds the transition 
from the assertion that it is a natural law (ius) that all things are held in 
common and thus a person in mortal need who takes from a person in 
surplus does not steal, to the new form of expression, that a person in 
need has a right (ius) to take from a person in surplus and so does not 
steal.3  The prevailing view of the canonists was that this new sort of ius, 
a right that an individual has, derives from the natural law that all human 
beings are, in a very particular sense, equal: namely, that we are all made 
in God’s image, that we are free to act for reasons, especially for reasons 
of good and evil.  We are rational agents; we are, more particularly, 
normative agents. 
This link between freedom and dignity became a central theme in the 
political thought of all subsequent centuries.  Pico della Mirandola, an early 
Renaissance philosopher who studied canon law in Bologna in 1477, 
gave an influential account of the link.  God fixed the nature of all other 
things, he said, but left man alone to determine his own nature.4  It is given 
to man “to have that which he chooses and be that which he wills.”5  
This freedom constitutes, as it is called in the title of Pico’s book, “the 
dignity of man.”6 
This same link between freedom and dignity was at the centre of the 
early sixteenth-century debates about the Spanish colonization of Latin 
 2. I present here what I take to be the present state of scholarship.  See JAMES A. 
BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 81 (1995); see also BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF 
NATURAL RIGHTS 35 (1997). 
 3. TIERNEY, supra note 2, at 69–77. 
 4. See GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 4–5 (Charles 
Glenn Wallis trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1965). 
 5. Id. at 5. 
 6. See supra note 4. 
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America.  Many canonists argued emphatically that the American natives 
were undeniably agents and, therefore, should not be deprived of their 
autonomy and liberty, which the Spanish army was everywhere doing.  
The same notion of dignity was also central to political thought in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when it received its most powerful 
philosophical development at the hands of Rousseau and Kant.  And this 
notion of dignity, or at any rate the word dignity, appears in the most 
authoritative claims to human rights in the twentieth century.  The United 
Nations says little in its declarations, covenants, conventions, and protocols 
about the grounds of human rights; it says simply that human rights 
derive from “the inherent dignity of the human person,”7 but the most 
plausible interpretation of their use of dignity is that it is the use of the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. 
Now, the human rights tradition, which I have condensed into very 
few words, does not lead inescapably to a particular substantive account 
of human rights.  There can be reasons to take a tradition in a new direction 
or to break with it altogether.  Nonetheless, the best substantive account 
of the existence conditions for human rights is, I should say, very much 
in the spirit of the tradition and goes like this. 
Human life is different from the life of other animals.  We human beings 
reflect; we form pictures of what a good life would be and try to realize 
these pictures.  That is what we mean by a characteristically human existence.  
It does not matter if some animals have more of our nature than we used 
to think, nor that there might be intelligent creatures elsewhere in the 
universe also capable of deliberation and action.  So long as we do not 
ignore these possibilities, there is no harm in continuing to speak of a 
characteristically human existence. And we value our status as human 
beings especially highly, often more highly even than our happiness.  
Human rights can then be seen as protections of our normative agency—
what I shall call our “personhood.” 
But personhood cannot be the only ground for human rights.  It leaves 
many rights too indeterminate.  For example, we have a right to security 
of person.  But what does that exclude?  Would it exclude forcefully taking 
a few drops of blood from my finger to save the lives of many others?  
Perhaps not.  To up the stakes, would it also not exclude forcefully taking 
 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 




one of my kidneys?  After all, the two weeks it would take me to recover 
from a kidney extraction would not deprive me of my personhood.  
Where is the line to be drawn?  The personhood consideration on its own 
will not make the line determinate enough for practice.  And if a proposed 
right cannot become a practicable claim that one person can make upon 
another, then it will not be a right.  That degree of determinateness is one 
of the existence conditions for rights.  To fix a sufficiently determinate 
line we should have to introduce considerations such as these: Given 
human nature, have we left a big enough safety margin? Is the right too 
complicated to do the job we want it to?  Is the right too demanding?, 
and so on.  We must consider how human beings and societies actually 
work.  So, to make the right to security of person determinate enough, 
we need another ground—call it “practicalities.”  I propose, therefore, 
two grounds for human rights: personhood and practicalities.  The existence 
conditions for a human right would, then, be these: One establishes the 
existence of such a right by showing, first, that it protects an essential 
feature of personhood, and, second, that its determinate content results 
from the sorts of practical considerations that I have roughly sketched. 
My statement here of the personhood account is too abbreviated to 
persuade doubters, but I have discussed it more fully elsewhere.8  One 
cannot get far in clarifying the human right to privacy without some 
remedy for the indeterminateness.  Those who reject the personhood 
account will have to put their own remedy in its place. 
II.  PERSONHOOD AND THE CONTENT OF A HUMAN                                          
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
With the resources of the personhood account to hand, we can make 
the following case for a human right to privacy.9  Without privacy, 
autonomy is threatened.  Most of us fear disapproval, ridicule, ostracism, 
and attack.  We are social animals; we seek acceptance by the group; we 
are severe self-censors, often unconsciously.  It takes rare strength to 
swim against strong social currents.  If our deliberation and decisions 
about how to live were open to public scrutiny, our imperative for self-
censorship and self-defence would come feverishly into action.  Of course, 
there are so far no mind-reading machines outside science fiction, but 
there are alternatives: seizing one’s diaries or papers, strapping one to a 
 8. See GRIFFIN, supra note 1. 
 9. One finds personhood offered as the ground for a right to privacy from time to 
time in the literature.  See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
243–44, 252–53 (1986); PHILIPPA STRUM, PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 
SINCE 1945, at 202–03 (1998); Lloyd Weinreb, The Right to Privacy, in THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY 25, 25 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds. 2000). 
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polygraph, administering truth drugs, or magnetic resonance imaging of 
the brain that, it is claimed, can distinguish truth-telling from lying with 
ninety-nine percent accuracy.10 
All of these threats are possible in the case of one person’s solitary 
thoughts.  But a lot of our most fruitful deliberation takes place in 
communication with others.  Frank communication extends our vision, 
corrects or confirms our ideas, gives us confidence to go on thinking 
boldly.  Frank communication, too, needs the shield of privacy; it needs 
the restraint of peeping Toms and eavesdroppers, of phone taps and 
bugging devices in one’s house, of tampering with one’s mail or seizure 
of one’s correspondence.  This is only a start, but we must also guard 
against padding the list.  Too often the form of argument for a human 
right, or a right of any kind, is to identify a value—say, a valuable form 
of privacy—and then conclude that there is a right that protects it.  But 
that is a blatant non sequitur.  Not all values support human rights, or 
indeed rights of other kinds.  For example, relaxation is valuable to us; 
without a certain kind of privacy one cannot fully relax.  But that hardly 
shows that there is a human right to relaxation.  Without relaxation, one 
might be a rather stressed agent, but if the stress is not great, one would 
be an agent all the same. 
So much for autonomy.  Think now of liberty.  Autonomy is a feature 
of deliberation and decision; it has to do with deciding for oneself.  
Liberty is a feature of action; it concerns pursuing one’s aims without 
interference.  Only with frank, private communication can I discover that 
you and I have certain of the same unpopular beliefs and so be confident 
enough to act singly or discover the opportunity to act jointly.  One 
would be inhibited from sexual experimentation, especially the kind that 
invites shock and disapproval, unless there was no fear of peeping Toms 
or hidden cameras.  The richness of personal relations depends upon our 
emerging from our shells, but few of us would risk emerging without 
privacy.  What is more, we need not only the fact but also the assurance 
of privacy, and for assurance we need well-established principles of 
behaviour, deep dispositions, strong social conventions, and laws effectively 
enforced.11 
 10. On the last, see Mark Henderson, Lie Test ‘99% Accurate,’ TIMES (London), 
Sept. 22, 2005, at 30. 
 11. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 203 (1998). 




The issue about a human right to privacy is whether certain forms of 
privacy are necessary conditions of normative agency.  What sort of 
necessity of condition is at issue?  Is this case not conceptual necessity?12  
One can conceive of a person’s functioning as a normative agent despite 
a plague of peeping Toms, listening devices, and magazines devoted to 
photographs of intimate moments.  The strongest form of necessity that 
could be meant here is empirical necessity: that a member of the species 
homo sapiens will not in fact function as a normative agent in the 
absence of these forms of privacy.  But that is implausible too.  There 
are a few people courageous enough or self-confident enough, or just 
exhibitionist enough, to thrive in full public gaze.  It is just that the rest 
of us cannot.  But as long as these familiar weaknesses are characteristic 
of humanity widely, they are enough to provide a ground for a human 
right.  Normative agency constitutes what we call “human dignity.”  Human 
rights are meant to protect the dignity of perfectly ordinary human 
beings.  It would distort the existence conditions for human rights to 
limit them to what is necessary for the normative agency of supermen or 
exhibitionists.  It would equally distort them, in the opposite direction, to 
include what is necessary for the normative agency of even the very 
most pusillanimous among us; it would be likely to result in too great a 
loss in other values, such as vigorous expression of opinion. 
That, then, is the narrow, agency-focused right to privacy derivable 
from the personhood account.  How much would it protect?  It is what 
several recent writers have labeled “informational privacy”: certain of 
my acts and thoughts and utterances should not be accessed by others 
 12. No doubt, Charles Fried’s use of inconceivable is hyperbolic.  See Charles 
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968). 
   It is my thesis that privacy is not just one possible means among others to 
insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to ends and relations 
of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust.  Privacy is not 
merely a good technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather 
without privacy they are simply inconceivable.  They require a context of 
privacy or the possibility of privacy for their existence. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Despite his talk of inconceivability, it looks, especially from the 
final sentence, that Fried really has in mind empirical necessity.  At other points, though, 
Fried seems to return to conceptual necessity: 
To make clear the necessity of privacy as a context for respect, love, friendship 
and trust is to bring out also why a threat to privacy seems to threaten our very 
integrity as persons.  To respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to 
regard ourselves as the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our 
notion of ourselves . . . . 
Id. at 477–78.  Without privacy, says Fried, there is no love, respect, friendship, or trust; 
without those we are, he seems to say, not persons.  But a misanthrope who does not love 
or respect others and is not loved or respected by them does not cease to be a person.  
But again, Fried shifts from a conceptual to an empirical point; the passage concludes: 
“[P]rivacy is the necessary atmosphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for 
combustion.”  Id. at 478. 
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and, if known to them, should not be further spread.  Which ones?  Ones 
that, if public, would typically threaten normative agency.  “Informational 
privacy” is not the ideal name; it suggests data—financial, medical, 
educational records, and the like—while it must be understood also to 
include certain correspondence, conversations, actions, even works of art 
if they are self-revealing and deliberately kept under wraps.  A peeping 
Tom’s mere observation must count, for our purposes, as a violation of 
informational privacy.  So long as we realize just how much the name 
“informational privacy” is meant to cover, it will do. 
A question for us is whether this right to informational privacy is too 
narrow to constitute the human right to privacy.  Over the last fifty years 
lawyers in several jurisdictions have appealed to a right to privacy 
in order to protect all of the following as well: the sale and use of 
contraceptives; abortion; sodomy; miscegenation; single-sex marriage; 
access to pornography; use of drugs in one’s own home; refusal to 
incriminate oneself; euthanasia; freedom from loud noises and foul 
smells that penetrate the home; not to have one’s reputation attacked; a 
father’s participation in the birth of his child; and much more.  No doubt, 
current appeals to the right to privacy are too broad.  But would we be 
willing to see them shrunk solely to informational privacy? 
III.  LEGAL APPROACHES TO THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Several national constitutions promise protection of “privacy.”13  The 
United States Bill of Rights never uses the word, but proclaims “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”14  Article 12 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour and reputation.”15  This is 
repeated almost verbatim in Article 17 of the International Covenant on 
 13. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. art. 19; CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 
32; CONSTITUTION, art. 23 (1963) (Nigeria); CONSTITUTION OF NORWAY art. 102; 
CONSTITUTION OF POLAND art. 74; CONSTITUTION OF PORTUGAL art. 8; Konstitutsiia SSSR 
(1965) [Konst. SSSR] [USSR Constitution] art. 8; CONSTITUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA art. 53; 
see also AMOS J. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (rev. 3rd ed. 1968). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 12, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 




Civil and Political Rights.16  The European Convention on Human Rights, 
Article 8, says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”17 
What one finds many times repeated in national and international 
documents are requirements of respect for or, more strongly, assertions 
of the sanctity of one’s person (security of person), private life, family 
life, home, and correspondence, with not infrequent mentions as well of 
protection against attacks on one’s honour and reputation.  On the face 
of it, this is a heterogeneous list.  One can see how married and family 
life, home, and correspondence might all be collected under the rubric 
“privacy.”  But what about attacks on one’s honour and reputation?  They 
seem a matter either of justified interest or of libel and slander, and their 
links with privacy are unclear. 
Our immediate interest in looking at the law is in what it suggests to 
us about the content of the human right to privacy, particularly what 
more it suggests than simply informational privacy.  The extreme brevity 
of what national constitutions and international declarations say about 
privacy, at which we have just had a glance, is not much help here.  It is 
more helpful to consult case law.  I want to look at the particularly rich 
case law on privacy grown up in recent decades around the United States 
Supreme Court.  Of course, the ultimate aims of deliberation of a judge, 
a legislator, and a moral philosopher need not be identical.  The constraints 
on a judge to interpret a constitution or a law and to build, where possible, 
on precedent, and the constraints on a legislator to find solutions to 
actual social problems and to stay within the bounds of what can feasibly 
be treated by law, are not as strong for a philosopher seeking to 
formulate a human right.  But I shall not be trying to interpret either 
United States law or Supreme Court decisions, but rather, to use them 
simply as prompts to thought. 
The first explicit, though unsuccessful, claim to a constitutional right 
to privacy appeared in Justice Louis Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States.18  The case concerned wiretapping.  But Brandeis’s worry 
about such intrusions went back a long while—to an article that he and 
Samuel D. Warren published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.19  As 
Brandeis wrote in his dissent in Olmstead, echoing the article: 
 16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 17. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 18. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis J., dissenting). 
 19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890).  The article had great influence on legal thinking in the United States.  
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) 
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The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage 
is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.  Ways may some day be developed by 
which the Government, without moving papers from secret drawers, can 
reproduce them in court . . . .  Advances in the psychic and related sciences may 
bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.20 
The privacy that exercises Brandeis here is informational privacy.  But 
he claims further that the constitutional right to privacy, deriving, he 
thinks, from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,21 provides protection 
against “invasion of ‘the sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.’”22  This looks like the right to the protection of some sort of private 
space and private side of life, with the value attaching to these forms of 
privacy serving as the ground of the right.  Call this “the privacy of space 
and life.”  The right to informational privacy protects us against people’s 
access to certain knowledge about us.  The right to the privacy of space 
and life protects us against intrusions into that space and into that part of 
(“Largely as a result of this article, some States have passed statutes creating . . .  a cause 
of action [for persons whose private affairs were exploited by others], and in others state 
courts have done the same thing by exercising their powers as courts of common law.”).   
It was Mrs. Warren who was the spur; she became alarmed at how advancing 
technology was eroding what hitherto had been quite naturally private.  Early cameras 
required the subject to sit still for a good while, so a photograph typically had the consent of 
its subject, but high speed cameras allowed the taking and publishing of photographs of 
private life without consent.  Whispers at the village water pump did not spread far, but 
then widely circulated newspapers appeared devoted largely to gossip.  The result of this 
alarm was Warren and Brandeis’s article, The Right to Privacy. 
 20. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 21. The Fourth Amendment states: 
   The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fifth Amendment states: 
   No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  All of the following amendments have been cited in the Supreme 
Court at one time or another as giving support to a right to privacy: the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 22. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 




our life―say, into our married or family life.  These two rights overlap 
in their protections, but, on the face of it, are different. 
Brandeis next takes a step that increases the range of the proposed 
right to privacy still further: 
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much 
broader in scope.  The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . .  They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and 
the right most valued by civilized men.23 
This seems to be something else again: a general right to liberty.  Brandeis, 
though, overstates it.  There is only, as doubtless he knew, a right to be 
let alone unless there is an overriding public interest.  Several well-known 
principles of liberty take this form: freedom of action unless an overriding 
public interest.  For instance, it is the form of John Stuart Mill’s principle of 
liberty: freedom of action unless harm to others.24  It is also the form of 
the principle of liberty much employed by the Supreme Court itself in the 
second half of the twentieth century: freedom of action unless certain 
forms of immorality, which may well include harm to others.  In Bowers 
v. Hardwick,25 the Court announced that people are generally to be let 
alone, but that the government is justified in forbidding acts as repellent to 
American sensibilities as oral and anal sex.26 
Why did Brandeis move so easily and so without remark from 
informational privacy to the relatively narrow privacy of space and life 
and, finally, to the broad privacy of liberty?  He moved so easily because 
he took these principles to be the same.  So did many subsequent writers, 
including many of his fellow Supreme Court Justices.27  Brandeis’s 
inferences suffer from his using different senses of the word private.  
Any principle of liberty defines an area into which authorities may not 
intrude, that is, an area not of legitimate public interest, that is, a private 
area.  Call this, as I did a moment ago, “the privacy of liberty.”  An 
enormous number of actions exhibiting the privacy of liberty are what 
we would ordinarily call “public.”  It would fall within our private sphere of 
 23. Id. at 478. 
 24. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10–11 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 
1975) (1859). 
 25. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 26. The defence of these prohibitions in Bowers v. Hardwick, id. at 190–91, 196, 
was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), explicitly on the grounds of 
liberty. 
 27. For instance, Morris L. Ernst and Alan U. Schwartz, in their book Privacy: The 
Right to Be Let Alone, equate them: “[W]e have chosen a subject uniquely personal in 
nature . . . the Right of Privacy, or, as we like to call it, the Right to Be Let Alone.”. 
MORRIS L. ERNST & ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY: THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE xii 
(1962). 
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liberty, for example, at least on Mill’s account of it, for two homosexuals to 
kiss very publicly.  The sense in which the intimacies of the locked diary 
and the marital bed are private is not the same as the technical sense, out 
of a general principle of liberty, in which a public kiss is private.  And it 
does not seem that the right to private space and private life is just a 
specific form of a general right to liberty.  The claim made by the 
Supreme Court, and by many others, seems to be that private space and 
private life are themselves valuable to us, indeed “sacred,” and that the 
right to them is derived from those values.  A general right to liberty, on 
the other hand, is derived from the value of our being able to pursue our 
conception of a worthwhile life; the values of private space and private 
life play no role in the derivation here.  A general right to liberty is a 
right to do various things: to pursue the life one values, and perhaps also 
to use contraceptives, to have an abortion, and to commit suicide.  
Liberty says nothing explicit about whether, when I do use contraceptive 
devices in the marital bed, you may not spy on me.  That is a further 
protection, needing a further rationale. 
This puzzling shift from informational privacy to the privacy of space 
and life and then to the privacy of liberty recurs often in subsequent 
Supreme Court thinking.  Four years before the famous Griswold v. 
Connecticut decision,28 which concerned Connecticut’s ban on the sale 
and use of contraceptive devices, the Court was invited to consider the 
very same ban in Poe v. Ullman,29 but declined on the ground that there 
were no controversies raised requiring the adjudication of a constitutional 
issue, with Justice Harlan dissenting.  Harlan insisted that, on the contrary, 
there were constitutional issues to be adjudicated, and to be adjudicated 
thus: 
Precisely what is involved here is this: the State is asserting the right to enforce 
its moral judgment by intruding upon the most intimate details of the marital 
relation . . . .  In sum, the statute allows the State [intolerably] to . . . punish 
married people for the private use of their marital intimacy.30 
This looks like an invocation of the right to private space and life, but 
only a few lines later Harlan’s identification of “precisely what is 
involved here” changes: “This enactment involves what, by common 
understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted 
 28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 29. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 30. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 




to be a most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty.’”31  Indeed, Harlan says, the 
liberty involved here is Brandeis’s liberty in Olmstead, the right to be let 
alone, which Harlan extols as “[p]erhaps the most comprehensive 
statement of the principle of liberty underlying these aspects of the 
Constitution.”32  When Harlan observes that the State of Connecticut is 
enforcing its own moral judgements, he might be thought to suggest that 
this in itself is wrong.  But he does not mean that.  The liberty involved 
is not absolute, he says; states may enforce morality.  So this is not 
Mill’s liberty—freedom of action unless harm to others.  It is the formally 
similar but materially different liberty: freedom of action unless certain 
forms of immorality.  Hence Harlan’s concentration on married couples.  
He leaves it open that, as far as the Constitution goes, fornicators, adulterers, 
homosexuals, and the incestuous may be denied contraceptives. 
Only four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, Harlan’s dissent 
became, in almost all major particulars, the Court’s view.  For the first time 
the Court itself declared a right of privacy, “the right of marital privacy”: 
The present case . . . concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy 
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. . . .  Would we allow the 
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms . . . ?  The very idea is 
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.33 
This seems clearly to be the right to private space (“the sacred precincts 
of marital bedrooms”) and to private relations (“the marriage relationship”), 
and it is the “sacredness” of the space and of the relationship that seems 
to be offered as the ground for the right.  But then, once again, comes the 
now familiar shift.  What Justice Goldberg, concurring,34 cites as the ground 
of the right to privacy is Brandeis’s general liberty―and, once again, not 
the liberty of freedom unless harm to others but freedom unless certain 
forms of immorality.  On Goldberg’s conception of liberty too, fornicators, 
adulterers, and homosexuals, no matter how private their acts, are not 
necessarily protected by the right.35 
The Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade,36 which ruled unconstitutional a 
comprehensive ban on abortion, stretched the idea of “privacy” yet 
further.  The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun,37 starts with 
an idea of privacy we have met before: 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 550. 
 33. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
 34. Id. at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 37. For an account of the development of Blackmun’s thought in drafting the 
opinion, see LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 78–101 (2005). 
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[T]he Court has [hitherto] recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution . . . .  [T]he right has some extension to activities relating to 
marriage, . . . procreation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships, . . . and 
child rearing and education.38 
This again looks like the right to private space (“areas or zones of 
privacy”) and private life (“marriage,” “procreation,” “family relationships”).  
But is an abortion private in either of these ways?  It does not always take 
place within private space, such as the home or the marital bedroom, but 
often in clinics or hospitals with doctors and nurses in attendance.  Nor 
is an abortion a matter of a personal relationship; it is in part a matter of 
a professional relationship.  Soon the same shift from the privacy of 
space and life to the privacy of general liberty occurs in Roe v. Wade.  
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, explains a person’s right to 
privacy as “his right to be let alone by other people”―that is, a general 
liberty.39 
The principles of liberty that we have so far canvassed are of the form 
freedom of action unless an overriding public interest.  Suppose liberty 
is, as Mill said, freedom of action unless harm to others.  Abortion 
of―death to―a fetus can, I think, often be regarded, without intolerable 
conceptual strain, as a “harm” to the potential person denied life.  But 
that is not enough to settle the moral question.  If the phrase “harm to 
others” is best glossed as “harm to other persons,” then we have to decide 
whether a fetus, or a fetus at a late stage of gestation, is a “person” in the 
morally freighted sense intended.  Suppose, on the other hand, that liberty is 
freedom of action unless certain forms of immorality.  Then we have to 
decide the question of the morality of abortion.  On either conception of 
liberty, we have to settle the major questions about the morality of 
abortion independently of the notion of privacy. 
The reasoning in the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade is, to my mind—
and hardly just to my mind—seriously flawed (though flawed reasoning, 
of course, does not imply wrong conclusion).  Conceptions of privacy 
that seem, prima facie, to fit other cases do not seem, even prima facie, 
to apply to abortion.  Liberty, however, does seem to apply, but various 
principles of liberty come with an “unless” clause that can hardly be 
ignored.  The Court, though, ignores it―and understandably so.  To confront 
it the Court would have had to take a stand on just the issues that then 
 38. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (citations omitted). 
 39. Id. at 168 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). 




deeply divided, and still divide, the country and the Court itself: for 
example, whether the fetus is a person, whether death harms the fetus, 
and whether, more generally, there is serious immorality in abortion.  So 
it is not surprising that the Court, in its majority opinion, while appealing 
also to liberty, chose not to stress it, but took refuge in ideas of private 
space and private relationships.  Once we endow private space or private 
relationships with “sanctity” we are off the hook: what then takes place 
in that space or in those relationships, whether moral or not, may not be 
regulated.  The disturbing trouble, though, is that the ideas of private 
space and private relationship do not fit abortion. 
What deserves our attention in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the 
Court declared Georgia’s criminalization of sodomy to be constitutional,40 
is Justice Blackmun’s dissent.41  The crux, he says, is the right to be let 
alone, and that right protects the practice of sodomy.42  By now we are 
familiar with how interpretations of Brandeis’s principle of liberty shift 
around.  But Blackmun goes on in his dissent to give a rationale for the 
right to general liberty different from any we have met before in Supreme 
Court deliberation, and a rationale, I should say, of great power: 
We protect those rights [associated with the family] . . . because they form so 
central a part of an individual’s life. . . .  We protect the decision whether to 
have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual’s self-
definition . . . .  The Court recognized in Roberts . . . that the “ability independently 
to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty” cannot truly be 
exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional enrichment from close 
ties with others.”43 
This important passage does two things worth our attention.  It offers a 
defence of informational privacy.  And it introduces a new conception of 
liberty.  It does both of these by putting great weight on the idea of 
personhood.  Our capacity as normative agents constitutes what the tradition 
has called “human dignity.”  As Blackmun put it, we are capable of self-
definition.  As the Court in the earlier Roberts decision put it, one has 
the “ability independently to define one’s identity,” and that, it added, “is 
central to any concept of liberty.”44  Normative agency cannot successfully 
be exercised in a vacuum.  We need to read and talk and assemble without 
pressures on us to conform, and that requires, among other things, the 
absence of various kinds of monitoring―that is, it requires informational 
privacy.  Blackmun’s appeal to a personhood conception of liberty was 
 40. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986). 
 41. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 204–05 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)), 
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 44. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. 
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not unique.  A few years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,45 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter also 
rejected the view of the earlier Courts and averred that “at the heart of 
liberty” is personhood.46 
This new personhood conception of liberty can be explained like this.  
As I pointed out earlier, there are narrow and wide conceptions of 
 45. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 46. Id. at 851. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
concerns the constitutionality of imposing certain restrictions on abortion—not a total 
ban but restrictions on how it may take place: for example, that a woman seeking an 
abortion must be provided with certain information twenty-four hours before the 
operation, and that a minor must have the informed consent of one parent.  The Court 
ruled that some of the Pennsylvania restrictions at issue were constitutional and some 
were not.  Though the Court’s decision paid occasional lip service to the idea of “privacy,” the 
crux, according to the majority of Justices, was liberty—the personal liberty conferred by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter emphatically rejected what had hitherto been the Court’s predominant 
conception of liberty: 
The controlling word in the cases before us is “liberty.” . . .  It is a promise of 
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the Government 
may not enter. . . .  Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our 
most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.  Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. 
Id. at 846–50.  And here are what seem to me the explicitly personhood terms in which 
they then go on to characterize liberty: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about 
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed 
under compulsion of the State. 
Id. at 851.  I point out their adoption of the personhood conception of liberty to show that 
Blackmun’s appeal to it in Bowers v. Hardwick was not unique.  Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter justify their repudiation of the Court’s earlier principle of freedom 
of action unless certain forms of immorality by appeal to epistemic modesty: 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some 
always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of 
terminating a pregnancy . . . .  The underlying constitutional issue is whether 
the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a 
woman lacks all choice in the matter . . . . 
Id. at 850.  This epistemic turn is, I think, unfortunate.  When it comes to the limits of 
liberty, the law cannot abjure all nondefinitive moral judgements.  Our moral views 
about a mother or a doctor killing a deformed newborn baby are also not definitive, but 
we believe that a state may, nonetheless, prohibit such acts.  In any case, one does not 
need to adopt epistemic modesty in order to reject the principle freedom of action unless 
certain forms of immorality.  The idea of liberty itself gives us strong reason not to 
interfere with agents open to rational persuasion.  One can reason with such agents, try to 
convince them, but often one may not, even if one knows definitively that they are 
wrong, decide for them.  Respect for liberty alone would be enough to hold one back. 




liberty.47  On the wide conception, any restriction on what one wishes to 
do is a restriction on one’s liberty, probably often justified.  This is what 
I have been calling here “freedom unless”—that is, blanket freedom 
unless there is a justification for a restriction.  On this conception, the 
one-way restriction on the road that I should love to nip down when I am 
late for work infringes my liberty, but no doubt justifiably.  The personhood 
account, however, yields a narrow conception of liberty.  What liberty 
protects, it says, is our pursuit of our conception of a worthwhile life.  
And my nipping the wrong way down a one-way street is certainly no 
part of my conception of a worthwhile life; it is too trivial for that.  On 
the narrow conception, the traffic restriction does not violate my liberty, 
even a very minor liberty.  It is a narrow conception because there are 
material constraints on it.  On the wide conception, the domain of liberty 
is everything left after the “unless” clause has made its exclusions; it is the 
large residue.  On the narrow conception, however, the domain of liberty 
is limited to what is major enough to count as part of the pursuit of a 
worthwhile life.  There is also, on the narrow conception, a formal 
constraint on the content of liberty: one is at liberty to do only what is 
compatible with equal liberty for all.  We shall come back to these two 
conceptions shortly. 
So much for my selective survey of Supreme Court decisions.  I do not 
pretend that it is a contribution to United States constitutional jurisprudence.  
I am not expert enough.  Rather, I want to use it to advance my project.  
What will it tell us about the content of the human right to privacy? 
IV.  HOW BROAD IS THE RIGHT?: (I) PRIVACY OF INFORMATION,                   
(II) PRIVACY OF SPACE AND LIFE, AND                                                                             
(III) PRIVACY OF LIBERTY 
We come away from the survey with three forms of privacy for our 
consideration: informational privacy, the privacy of space and life, and 
the privacy of liberty.  We have thereby identified various understandings of 
the right to privacy, one for each of these three forms of privacy and four 
for their possible combinations, so seven altogether.  And we have 
encountered two different understandings of liberty: a broad or residual 
liberty and a relatively narrow liberty derived from personhood.  We 
have also encountered two different examples of residual liberty: freedom 
unless harm to others and freedom unless certain forms of immorality, 
though in principle there are more. 
What solid ground is there in all of this?  There are, it seems to me, 
two pieces of solid ground.  One is the right to informational privacy.  
 47. GRIFFIN, supra note 1, ch. VII § 2. 
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We have seen the solid enough ground for considering at least that to be 
a human right.  The second piece of solid ground is the right to liberty.  
The question of whether the broad or narrow interpretation of liberty is 
to be adopted is still with us, but nobody doubts that there is a general 
right to liberty, on one or the other of the understandings. 
We must now try to make some of the rest of the ground firmer.  Let 
me start with the relation of privacy and liberty.  Should we, in the cases 
that have concerned us, forget about the right to privacy and appeal 
solely to the right to liberty?  Does liberty do all the work?  No, I should 
say.  What Justice Stevens meant by “liberty” in his opinion in Bowers v. 
Hardwick is what I mean by “liberty” as distinct from “autonomy.”  The 
various principles of liberty we have identified all concern “liberty” in 
my distinct sense.  But informational privacy, which certainly constitutes 
at least part of a right to privacy, rests not only on liberty but also on 
autonomy.  As I said earlier, we need certain forms of privacy to develop 
the confidence and capacity to overcome the enormous barriers to 
autonomous decision. 
I explained earlier still, in discussing practicalities,48 why, though the 
value of normative agency constitutes much of the value attaching to 
human rights, the rights cannot be fully reduced to it.  There is also a looser 
pragmatic sense of reducibility in which human rights are irreducible.  
We could not discard specific rights and appeal only to the overarching 
right to normative agency without practical loss.  It is hardly enough to 
give police the instruction: “Do not violate normative agency.”  There is a 
lot of work and judgement, usually not at all obvious, involved in a 
strict derivation of a specific right, such as privacy, from the overarching 
interest—normative agency.  A society would not successfully protect human 
rights if it appealed only to the one overarching value.  We need to spell 
out far more specific rules such as respect for a person’s privacy of 
information, that is, a person’s correspondence, diaries, beliefs, associations, 
and so on.49 
 48. Id. ch. II § 5. 
 49. I therefore agree with Ruth Gavison that the right to privacy can always be 
reduced to some other interest and right, but that it can be reduced hardly shows that it 
can also be jettisoned.  See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 
421, 459–71 (1980).  I disagree with Judith Jarvis Thomson’s claim that the rights to 
various forms of privacy are all justified by more basic property rights and rights over 
one’s body.  But the human right to privacy—a right to informational privacy—is best 
seen as justified by autonomy and liberty, not by property rights or Thomson’s highly 




Let me now turn to the key question: Is there more to privacy than 
informational privacy?  I want to suggest that we say “No.”  The Supreme 
Court, of course, has repeatedly said “Yes.” 
I have two reasons for doubting the existence of a right to privacy of 
space and of life as the Supreme Court has conceived it.  First, not only 
is it not needed to settle the Court’s questions about contraception, 
abortion, and many others, it is also not what actually does settle them.  
Justice Stevens is right: the issue they raise is liberty.  The government 
may not interfere with my using contraceptives, or with my partner’s 
having an abortion, or with my watching pornographic films, and much 
else besides, unless there is a substantial enough public interest to outweigh 
my liberty, and in all of these cases there is none.  That, anyway, is what 
I should be willing to argue, and it is, at any rate, the real issue. 
My second reason for scepticism is the difficulty of finding any 
plausible explanation of why private space and private life should have 
the sort of considerable value that supports a human right.  It is easy to 
explain it in the case of informational privacy; that sort of privacy is a 
necessary condition of normative agency and so is instrumentally valuable.  
But why should we care about, say, a private space?  There is an ancient 
saying that still exerts an influence on our modern thought about private 
space: an Englishman’s home is his castle.  For a long while, a man (the 
gender is essential) was accepted as an absolute sovereign in his own 
house.  This sentiment originated in an age when a man had his goods 
and chattels, with his animals included among his chattels and his wife 
and children often not a big step above them.  But now we think that 
society has urgent and still insufficiently recognized duties to regulate 
what goes on inside the private space, even in the marital bed.  Society 
now rightly exerts control over marital rape, violence against the spouse, a 
parent’s physical or sexual abuse of a child, the parents’ neglect of their 
child’s health or education, and a family’s cruelty to its animals.  Justice 
Blackmun avers that what is particularly protected against state regulation is 
“intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places,”50 but that is doubtful.  
The ancient idea of an Englishman’s home, with a privacy that was a near 
absolute bar to outsiders, has given way to a much more permeable modern 
privacy.  These remarks bring out the force of the feminist attack on 
privacy, but feminists have an objection not to the true human right to 
privacy, but merely to a patriarchal distortion of it.51 
dubious version of rights over one’s body.  See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to 
Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975). 
 50. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 51. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187–
94 (1989). 
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Our question is not whether private space is of some value.  Of course, 
it is.  One needs private space the better to relax, and the better to be 
creative—Virginia Woolf’s “room of one’s own.”52  But though Virginia 
Woolf’s point might be good reason for my family’s aspiration to, say, 
each have a room of our own, it is most implausible that it gives us a 
human right to one.  There are levels of health and education, as well as 
kinds of privacy, that are highly desirable but beyond what is required 
by human rights.  But what of other cases?  We are often concerned for 
the privacy of nonagents—for example, patients in a nursing home with 
advanced dementia.  Their privacy is not only morally important, but it 
is also, we say, a matter of the dignity to be accorded to the human 
person.  Why does not this non-agency value therefore, contrary to what 
the personhood account says, support a human right?  But one cannot 
conclude merely from the fact that we speak here of “human dignity” 
that a human right is involved; the expression human dignity is far too 
widely used for that inference to be valid.  Is not the more plausible 
explanation instead this: that those sunk in dementia still deserve deep 
respect for the full persons they once were, traces of whom may still 
survive, and anyone who lacks that respect has grossly defective feelings?  
The same is true, though to a somewhat lesser degree, of someone who 
lacks deep feelings of respect for the dead body of a beloved parent.  But 
in neither case does the respect seem to be best explained in terms of 
possession of a human right.  Appropriate behaviour does not always 
have to be determined by rights. 
Does an undetected peeping Tom with a blissfully ignorant victim, 
then, not violate his victim’s right to privacy?  After all, he does not actually 
inhibit his victim’s agency.  But a human right is a right that one has simply 
in virtue of being human; one does not actually have to be a victim.  
What grounds the right to privacy is that certain forms of publicity 
typically inhibit human agency.  The right is borne universally by human 
beings simply because of this typical vulnerability.  So the right would 
be violated even by an undetected peeping Tom.  Besides, the second 
ground of human rights, practicalities, which is also universal in scope, 
will lead to an easily grasped and widely drawn private domain: one that 
will foster the levels of assurance that agency needs, as well as perhaps 
 52. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 2 (Barnes & Noble 2007) (1929) 
(“All I could do was to offer you an opinion upon one minor point—a woman must have 
money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction . . . .”). 




supply a reassuring buffer zone.  There are the demands of the human 
right to privacy in any society, but the exact levels concerned may vary 
in time and place.  To employ an earlier distinction,53 basic human rights 
are universal in the class of persons.  But derived human rights, ones that 
arise from applying a basic human right to a particular time and place, 
may vary in content from society to society.  In our present society it might 
require, at least for a while longer, protection of our nakedness and 
certain other culturally determined forms of modesty, which we know 
not all other human societies, or groups within our own society, need.54 
What we have been looking for is a value attaching to private space 
besides, on the one hand, one that though undoubtedly a value is insufficient 
to support a human right and, on the other, a value that supports a human 
right but only because of its instrumental connection to informational 
privacy.  At a certain point one must just either produce such a value or 
confess that one cannot find any.  I confess that I cannot find any. 
I believe, nonetheless, that we should retain a form of the right to 
privacy of space—only much more restricted than, and differently based 
from, the one that the Supreme Court employed.  There is this instrumental 
argument.  It is doubtful that society would be successful in keeping my 
correspondence and beliefs and sexual practices private if its officials 
were free to walk into my house whenever they liked.  Also, laws, even 
moral laws, need to work with fairly clear, easily understood boundaries, 
and the walls of one’s house form a far clearer boundary than the line 
between one’s beliefs and practices that are relevant to informational 
privacy and those that are not.  And around what is especially valuable 
to us we like, for good practical reasons, to have an ample buffer zone.  
So perhaps for reasons such as these the right to privacy will include a 
private space.  But, even if so, the value of a private space would, on this 
explanation, depend on the value of informational privacy.  So this gives 
us no reason to treat privacy of space as an independent addition to 
informational privacy. 
What holds of private space holds too of private life.  “Private life” covers, 
among other things, certain personal relationships.  They are a major 
component of a good life and, indeed, central enough in most people’s 
conception of a good life to help support a human right, usually liberty.  
Liberty is being free to pursue one’s conception of a worthwhile life, and 
society can improperly interfere with its pursuit both by erecting a 
 53. GRIFFIN, supra note 1, ch. II § 8. 
 54. This might explain why the following is not just a violation of a legal right to 
privacy, but a violation of our human right to privacy: “The owner of a country guest 
house rigged up a secret camera to film guests naked in a bathroom, a court was told 
yesterday.”  Simon de Bruxelles, Hotelier Filmed His Guests in the Bath, TIMES (London), 
July 12, 2003, at 13. 
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barrier between one and one’s ends, say by legal prohibition, and by 
undermining the necessary conditions of the end itself, say by destroying 
the privacy that personal relations need.  But the privacy that they need is 
informational privacy, as a necessary condition for autonomy and liberty.  
The privacy of space and of relationships is playing no further, independent 
role. 
V.  A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
My proposal is that we reduce the human rights that we appeal to in 
settling the cases we have had before us to two: the fairly circumscribed 
right to informational privacy and the long established right to liberty. 
Early on I listed some of the heterogeneous issues claimed to be settled 
by the right to privacy.  If my proposal is accepted, the list will have to 
be considerably trimmed.  On my proposal, the following issues are to 
be settled, not by appeal to privacy, but by appeal to liberty: contraception, 
abortion, homosexual acts, pornography, interracial marriage, single-sex 
marriage, and euthanasia. 
The following issues, however, are to be settled by appeal to privacy: 
wiretapping, planting listening devices in a person’s house, unauthorized 
photographs of or other forms of information about one’s sexual life or 
intimate personal relations, publishing membership lists of political 
organizations, disseminating information about one’s sexual life or 
personal relations unless there is an overriding public interest, and, if 
practicalities do indeed counsel extending the exclusion zone to the 
walls of the house, then a derived right to the privacy of that space. 
Then there are what are claimed to be issues of privacy that are in fact 
issues neither of privacy nor of liberty: nuisance noises and smells that 
penetrate the house (Is this an issue of human rights at all? Is it not a 
matter for some other part of tort law that has no bearing on human 
rights?), attacks on one’s honour and reputation (Again, is this an issue 
of human rights?  Should it not also be left to another part of tort law?), 
and two closely related matters―rights to security of person and to 
bodily integrity.  Each of these two rights is derivable from normative 
agency.  One would have no security of agency without certain kinds of 
security of person or of body.  So these rights do not seem to be a matter 
of either liberty or privacy.  There is also the supposed right to determine 
what happens in and to one’s body.  One interpretation of this further 
right is that it asserts that one’s body is a private space, within which one 
is sovereign or near sovereign.  It has prominently been cited to defend a 




woman’s right to abortion.55  In this use, it echoes the ancient claim of 
male domination: an Englishman’s home is his castle.  It becomes the 
modern claim of female domination: a woman’s body is her castle.  And 
it is equally suspect.  Would it protect a woman’s taking drugs likely to 
seriously deform her fetus, or having as many children as she wants?  
Would it protect a woman’s, or a man’s, refusal to be safely inoculated 
against a disease that seriously endangers public health, or to supply a 
breath or blood or urine or DNA sample?  Would it make mandatory 
drug tests for airline pilots an infringement of their rights?  Would it 
give us a human right to sell our body parts?  I suspect that there is 
nothing to this supposed right except what is already included in the 
right to liberty or in the right to security of person.  In any case, it seems 
not a matter of privacy.56 
 55. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 47, 
52–61 (1971). 
 56. For completeness sake, one should explain why various rights in the United 
States Bill of Rights thought to imply a right to private space or private life do not really 
do so.  In Supreme Court jurisprudence, the right against self-incrimination has been 
taken to rest on a right to the privacy of one’s thoughts.  For example, Justice Douglas 
wrote for the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965): “Various 
guarantees create zones of privacy. . . .  The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination 
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force 
him to surrender to his detriment.”  Does the right against self-incrimination assume the 
privacy of thought?  Does it not rest, instead, on the avoidance of injustice?  A 
confession is not, for many reasons, ideal evidence.  Putting great weight on confession 
easily degenerates into the judicial practices of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber.  It 
leads readily to torture, and though torture is obviously wrong for the agony it involves, 
it is also wrong, and a matter of a human right, because it is typically used to undermine 
a person’s agency; it is meant to take away a person’s ability to decide what to do and 
then to stick to the decision.  Is not the right against self-incrimination based on procedural 
justice and the protection of normative agency?  “Our forefathers wisely inserted the 
Fifth Amendment in our Constitution in an attempt to prevent inquisitions of the types so 
common in Europe at that time and to protect accused citizens against being compelled 
to incriminate themselves under torture.”  Louis C. Wyman, A Common Sense View of the 
Fifth Amendment, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 155, 157 (1960).  McNaughton 
remarks that “the policy underpinning the privilege [against self-incrimination] is 
anything but clear.”  John T. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its 
Constitutional Affectation, Raison d’Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 138, 150 (1960).  But his own conclusion is that it had two 
purposes: First, “to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances where 
compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive tactics by 
a zealous questioner,” and second, “to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual 
is sovereign and . . . that the individual not be bothered for less than good reason . . . .”  Id. 
at 151. 
And what of the now antique Third Amendment right not to have troops forcibly quartered 
in one’s house?  Does that imply, as in Supreme Court jurisprudence it has been taken to 
imply, a right to private space?  Again see Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 484: “Various guarantees create zones of privacy. . . .  The Third Amendment in 
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without 
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.”  The American colonists had 
greatly resented the British Army’s forcibly quartering its troops in their family houses.  
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VI.  PRIVACY VERSUS FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND                                        
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION 
There is a worry.  Will one person’s right to privacy not constantly be 
in conflict with other persons’ freedom of expression?  And if the right 
is specifically to informational privacy, will it not often be in conflict 
with other people’s right to information? 57  I think not. 
To decide whether two rights really conflict it is not enough to know 
their names.  One must know their content.  Freedom of expression is 
freedom to state, discuss, and debate anything relevant to our functioning as 
normative agents: religion, ethics, learning, art, and whatever goes on in 
society or government that bears on our thinking and deciding autonomously 
and being free to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life.  If I stop a 
friend from mischievously shouting “Fire” in a crowded theatre, or simply 
from boring us with stories about his holiday, I do not infringe his freedom 
of expression, even in a small way.  Similarly, the right to information is 
a right to the information needed to function as a normative agent: access 
to the relevant thoughts of others, to the arts, to exchange of ideas, and, in a 
democracy, to information about the issues before the public, certain of 
the government’s acts and intentions, and so on.  If the government of 
my country does not reveal certain of its acts and intentions, my right to 
information may be infringed.  If the newspapers in London fail to 
publish the results of my favourite baseball team in Cape Cod, I may be 
maddeningly frustrated but my right to information will not be infringed. 
With an adequate understanding of the public-private distinction in 
place, society could then demand much finer-grained arguments for the 
existence of a public interest than anything we are offered now.58  The 
The Third Amendment does not guarantee that it will not happen in the future, only that 
it will not happen in peacetime, and happen in wartime only “in a manner to be prescribed 
by law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. III.  So does the Third Amendment define a human right (the 
word right is never used), or merely promise to reduce and, to some extent, regulate a 
much resented, though still possibly necessary, practice?  If the Third Amendment has 
any link to privacy, it would be because the forced quartering of troops would threaten 
our informational privacy, just as having the police coming and going in our houses at 
their will would do.  But the comparison with frequent police intrusion is farfetched; 
forced quartering of troops was fairly rare. 
 57. For an example, see Adam Sherwin, Privacy Law Ruled Incompatible with 
Free Press, TIMES (London), June 17, 2003, at 4. 
 58. It is not that the harmony between the rights to privacy, free expression, and 
information will be complete.  Even after we have located this new line between the 
public and the private, the two domains can overlap.  The sort of truly private discussion 
between a group of people about the injustices of society and their possible remedies 




argument that adopting a public life forfeits a private life is ridiculous.  
So too is the argument that, it is reported, many journalists use to establish a 
public interest: “Anything may be relevant to assessment of a person’s 
character.”59  True, anything may be relevant to a person’s character, but 
not everything relevant to a person’s character is of public interest.  The 
odious practice of outing homosexuals, for instance, has also been 
defended on the ground of public interest.  In 1994 Peter Tatchell, the 
head of the British organization OutRage!, urged ten unnamed Anglican 
bishops to admit their homosexuality, with the threat of outing hanging 
over their heads.60  Outing, he said, was justified “when public figures abuse 
their power to harm other gay people.”61  “Queer homophobes,” he went on, 
“are hypocrites, and their hypocrisy deserves to be exposed.”62  There is an 
apparent public interest here: a society is the healthier for combating 
certain forms of hypocrisy; it is certainly better for combating injustice.  
But a homosexual bishop who believes, even if misguidedly, that priests 
should not be active homosexuals is not necessarily abusing his power.  
Not all persons whose appearance differs from their reality are thereby 
hypocrites.  A homophobe, whether homosexual or not, who acts hostilely 
towards homosexuals solely because they are homosexual is unjust.  The 
injustice deserves exposure.  That is the public interest.  But if the homophobe 
is himself also homosexual, to publicize that further fact is protected 
neither by the outer’s freedom of expression nor the public’s right to 
information.  On the contrary, it is an outrageous infringement of the 
homophobe’s right to privacy.63  It is not that a person’s sex life is never 
of public interest64 but that usually it is not.65 
might include decisions and plans to mount terrorist attacks that a journalist who learns 
of them would rightly regard as being of public interest. 
 59. As reported by Laurence Marks, The Right to Be Left Alone: An Argument for 
and Against a Privacy Law, OBSERVER (London), Jan. 17, 1993, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 60. Peter Tatchell & John Lyttle, I’m Out with the In Crowd; No Different from the 
Terror Tactics of the Tabloids—or a Just Cause? Peter Tatchell and John Lyttle Clash 
Over the Ethics of ‘Outing’ Homosexuals, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 30, 1998, at 4. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. There are less easy cases.  Could publishing a revelatory biography violate its 
subject’s privacy?  Here the potential public interest might be precisely the subject’s 
private life.  We often benefit from a biography by having the whole of human life 
illuminated for us—for example, how a person’s sexuality affected his or her art.  I think 
that the right to privacy would enter consideration only if the subject were alive, because 
it concerns the inhibition of one’s normative agency (though there is something arbitrary 
in this: one’s normative agency can even be inhibited by fear of what will come out after 
one’s death). 
 64. There was a more plausible case for a public interest (a security risk) when, in 
the early 1960s John Profumo was Secretary of State for War in the British Cabinet and 
enjoying the services of a prostitute also being enjoyed by the military attaché at the 
Soviet embassy.  But even here, had there been a law prohibiting publication of a 
person’s sex life unless there was a public interest and no other way of meeting that 
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We are easily confused on these matters because, with human rights, 
we have been content merely to know their name.  But we also have 























interest, the newspapers would have been forced to take their information to the police or 
the intelligence services, which would have been both more efficient and more humane.  
There are, of course, considerations on the other side to be weighed: for example, would 
newspapers engage in this sort of sometimes useful investigative journalism if there were 
no prospect of publication? 
 65. There are any number of illustrations of how desperately societies need clearer 
and higher standards for establishing a public interest.  In London, The Independent 
revealed in 1992 that Virginia Bottomley, then Secretary of State for Health, gave birth 
to her first child three months before her marriage, twenty-five years earlier, to the 
child’s father and still her husband.  Editorial, Leading Article: In the Public Interest, 
INDEPENDENT (London), July 14, 1992, at 16.  An invasion of privacy, her husband charged to 
the Press Complaints Commission.  Id.  “A legitimate public interest,” The Independent 
replied, arguing in a leader that the story “added to our understanding to discover that an 
able and widely respected Secretary of State for Health, drawing attention to the 
problems surrounding young unmarried mothers, should have gone through the difficult 
though in no way discreditable experience herself.”  Id.  What a sorry state of society in 
which The Independent would have the effrontery to publish such a feeble argument. 
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